What does it take to be a theologian?

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There is a really interesting post over at the Church Postmodern Culture blog contesting Peter Rollins’s claim that Slavoj Žižek is a “dialectical materialist theologian.” Geoffrey Holsclaw suggests that to call Žižek a theologian is to “misunderstand Žižek’s project” as an atheist (albeit a certain type of atheist which should be carefully distinguished from the new atheist fundamentalists a la “Ditchkins“) and to “seriously downgrade theology.”
Interesting. And strong.
Which raises the question: what does it take to be a theologian? What are the qualifications, prerequisites, and prior philosophical convictions to which one must assent in order to claim the title theologian?
In the case of Žižek, I find it a bit odd to dismiss him as theologian purely on his being an atheist and possibly tainting theology. First, such a stance supposes an unvarying notion of atheism. Žižek is not your normal (modern) atheist and would undoubtedly detest the idea of being grouped together with the likes of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens in the same way that progressive Christians dislike being painted with the same brush as Christian fundamentalists. So I think that charge lacks the proper nuance and care. Furthermore, aren’t we all atheists of some sort? Don’t we all reject certain gods?
Second, the accusation that naming Žižek as a theologian does the theological enterprise itself a disservice supposes a very rigid definition of theology and may give Žižek more credit than is due. As far as I can tell, Žižek rejects any notion of transcendence, a tenet that Holsclaw believes to be central to the aim of theology. He writes:
If theology is merely the sociology or anthropology of religion run through the Lacanian registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, then I might as well become a stock broker. If theology is merely explication of the immanent infinitude of human subjectivity, the void of the cosmos, the height and depth of reality, then let’s own up to that (which I believe Žižek has).
Why should these things be off the table? I for one would like to keep the channels of conversation open here rather than demanding that all theologizing acceptance some idea of transcendence. Here is a question: does a theologian need to choose between the two, between transcendence and immanence? Is one acceptable and the other out of bounds? Does one need to accept a certain definition of God and ultimate reality before being allowed a place at the table that is theology?
Setting Žižek aside, I’d like to go back to that original question. What does it take to be a theologian? Who qualifies? At the superficial level, I’m tempted to say that everyone is a theologian whether he or she realizes it or not. Our mode of being in the world will always already be emblematic of our belief(s) about God and ultimate reality whether we overtly confess that belief or not. But I understand the need to zero in on something more precise. I just wonder if placing superfluous limitations on what it means to be a theologian is more of a reflection on our own notions about God, religion, and divinity than the larger enterprise itself. I become deeply suspicious once we start taking things off the table for questioning.
I’m interesting in your thoughts on this. How would you define a theologian? What does it take to be one?
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