Do we get Kierkegaard wrong?
I’ll put all my cards on the table: I think Kierkegaard is unfortunately habitually misread today. The common reading as dictated by the philosophical and theological canon and undoubtedly displayed in undergraduate intro. courses couches (and caricatures) Kierkegaard as a prime example of religious fidelity gone awry. His “teleological suspension of the ethical” represents all that is wrong and dangerous with religion after the Enlightenment and such a position is decidedly irrational, lacking the proper grounding in ethical reasoning. That is one reading. To be sure, it is important and one that should be not ignored, but it is, however, not the only one nor is it, in my view, the best one.
I was re-reading some articles and interviews by John Caputo in preparation for Emergent Outliers’ first book club meeting tonight (you should join us!) when I ran across an interesting reading of Kierkegaard that avoids that usual, banal approach and obliquely offers a critique of modern ethics. Commenting on Derrida‘s reading of Fear and Trembling, Caputo writes that:1
“Responsibility is the issue of the singularity of the situation of the responing subject (for which “Abraham” is a place-holder) standing alone before the “wholly other” (for which “God” is a place-holder) while the demands of the “other others” (for which Isaac is a place-holder) press in upon and interrupt the intimacy of this exclusive tête-à-tête ["head-to-head"]. Thus, to decide responsibly is always a matter of sacrificing “Isaac,” the ones who hold the Isaac position, by which he [Derrida] means, of sensitizing oneself to my responsibility to all the other others who also lay claim to my responsibility, even as I respond to the other one before me. Unlike de Silentio, Derrida’s analysis does not turn a suspension of my ethical duty in the face of the religious call that overrides it, but on the conflict of ethical duties that structures every ethical choice, which makes the paradox of the akedah [the binding of Isaac] the paradigm of everyday ethical decisions right on down to the smallest detail….”
Interesting. So instead of fixating on Abraham’s suspension of ethics perhaps it is helpful to read the narrative in a different manner, one that recognizes the sacrifice and conflict that is inherent in every ethical decision. One must always, in every situation (even the most mundane and seemingly insignificant), chose between opposing responsibilities as there always other others. That is the paradox of ethics and a paradox that most popular approaches to ethics (the deontological, utilitarianism, etc.) seem to avoid precisely because they are impermeable systems conceived in the abstract, demanding fidelity to a certain set of presupposed to premises which may or may not relate to the situation at hand. I suspect that this is what Caputo is getting at in his book Against Ethics (though I have not read it in it entirety) and I believe that this is what the usual readings of Kierkegaard miss: that modern ethical systems, while helpful as guidelines, will always be deconstructible insofar as they posit a set of disembodied propositions that must be applied to situation that always already has other cards that have been played ahead of time.
Such a critique virtually renders moot the tiring discussions we’ve all had over which ethical system is the best because all systems are in agreement that the most proper approach should be conceived in the abstract, relying on the so-called impartiality of Reason and constructed outside palpable relations with the wholly Other and other others. But the true ethical dilemma is the one that catches us by surprise as we realize the impossible choice we must make between two responsibilities, two others who have already laid claim to us. Such an event, not at all unlike the one faced by Abraham, simply cannot be solved by a intangible system alone.
That is, I believe, an unsung lesson of Kierkegaard and one that Caputo and Derrida can both return to after the desert of modern criticism: that there is always already conflict inherent in every ethical situation, conflict that cannot be fully resolved and conflict that demands a choice between rival responsibilities and irreconcilable others.
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- The quotation is taken from an article Caputo wrote in the 2002 Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook titled, “Looking the Impossible in the Eye: Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Repetition of Religion, pg. 8-9. Caputo writes on the same subject at length in The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, but the article provides the most concise and lucid description of his larger, more complex argument. [↩]
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My undergrad philosophy prof. was a huge Kierkegaard nut and I can say (thankfully) that I have never heard a reading like the “common” reading. Great post!
andrewtatum
16 Jul 09 at 7:29 am
I'm unsure how you can argue that based on Derrida's unorthodox reading of Fear and Trembling this would suggest we have gotten Kierkegaard wrong. Derrida's Gift of Death seems more about exploring the notion of responsibility than unearthing the true reading of FT. This is a similar move he makes throughout many of his books, in for instance Specters of Marx where he motivates a reading of the Marxism to explore ghosts and memory. So, while I agree that Derrida focuses more on our responsibility to the wholly other and the courage we must assume to own up to in our responsibility to be accountable, I don't think that would suggest Derrida discovers the true Kierkegaard.
Are you familiar with any of Mark C Taylor's writings? He wrote a book called Erring, which is probably one of the most important statements on deconstruction and theology. Anyway, he wrote an article about Kierkegaard and Derrida in his book called Nots surrounding the binding of Isaac. If you're a big fan of Caputo, you should definitely investigate more into Taylor's thought. He tends to take a much more immanent/atheistic reading of deconstruction while Caputo's position is clearly more transcendent and Levinasian. While he tends to be closer to Altizer/Hegel than Kierkegaard/Caputo, his a/theology is fascinating nevertheless.
Jeremy
16 Jul 09 at 8:24 am
Excellent observation. I find Caputo to be remarkably insightful at times.
cineboy
16 Jul 09 at 10:56 am
Wow. I had a bad flashback from English classes 20 years ago while reading that.
My reading is obviously less broad than yours. But I thought utilitarians and deontologists (?) would agree that choice is demanded in any ethical quandry. We are in a quandry because there is conflict. Without conflict, we do not have to resort to ethical reasoning at all.
Kant wanted to tell us how to chose, not argue that choice was not necessary. Or maybe I misunderstand the point here. This is always a probable answer.
John Meunier
16 Jul 09 at 6:39 pm
I probably should have made myself more clear in the post. The title
was, of course, meant to be a bit provocative as a rhetorical device.
Not that I don't think it is a question we should pose to ourselves,
but I didn't necessarily answer it. At least that was not my intent.
I don't want claim that Derrida has the true Kierkegaard and more than
I want to claim that those who broker the more traditional reading
do. Rather, I would say that we do get Kierkegaard wrong when we
don't allow room for other readings that are contrary to the dominate
interpretation. We get him wrong when our reading becomes
totalizing. In my experience that is what tends to happen with the
usual critique of Kierkegaard's ethics.
I'm not as familiar with Mark Taylor as I am Caputo though I have read
Errings. I'll have to track down his commentary on Kierkegaard. It
sounds very interesting. At this point in time, I find myself more in
line with Levinas, Caputo et al. than the other position. That, of
course, may change. We'll see.
Thanks for the feedback.
Blake Huggins
16 Jul 09 at 8:14 pm
Your point is similar so some other criticisms I've read of Derrida's
reading.
At the risk of grossly oversimplifying an otherwise very complex
argument (and putting words in both Captuo and Derrida's mouth) I'll
try and respond as I think they likely would.
Of course there is a least a superficial “choice” or “conflict” that
is posed in X situation, but the point that I think Derrida is trying
to make is that traditional ethical systems remove that element by
creating a method that, when properly followed, virtually creates a
situation where there is no real choice involved. One follows the
predetermined system to solve the surface problem. You mention Kant.
His categorical imperative is the best example of this. You apply the
rule “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law” to the situation at
hand and go with the outcome regardless. Conversely, from a hard
teleological point of view, you act in such a way that the outcome of
your action results in the most “good” regardless of the action you
taken. Both example essentially remove the element of conflict
because they defer to an outside system conceived in the abstract.
Again, to oversimplify, for Derrida the lesson of Kierkegaard is that
the true ethical dilemma is the one that does not defer to such a
system but rather views the conflict of the situation — the choice
between conflicting responsibilities, between other others and the
Wholly Other — in all its nudity and horror.
Based on my reading thus far that seems to be the Derridean/Caputoian
position. I find that to be a more interesting and helpful reading of
Kierkegaard than the usual critique.
Blake Huggins
16 Jul 09 at 8:28 pm
Certainly, the last thing Kierkegaard would ever have wanted was to encourage anything totalizing given his penchant for mocking Hegel's complete system. I don't think Derrida's reading is wrong given the all of the ambiguity in the Abraham and Isaac story, I just found your statement that we misread Kierkegaard a bit too strong.
Perhaps Taylor's best work was his study on difference in many structuralists/postructuralists authors in his book Altariy.
Also, I imagine one needs to lean one the side of Levinas/Caputo if one wants to leave room for any sense of transcendence, whereas Hegel/Altizer/Taylor/Zizek outright deny any sort of possibility and are the true Christian atheists.
Jeremy
17 Jul 09 at 9:57 am
Regarding choice and deontology/utilitarianism: choice plays an enormous role for Kierkegaard, as well. In terms of ethics, it's probably foundational.
Blake, I agree with you that the “common” reading of Kierkegaard gets him wrong in terms of irrational fideism. I think at root the issue is whether or not we think there is some neutral position by which to stand on. From those I've encountered and discussed Kierkegaard with, it generally seems like if you do think there is a “neutral position,” (ie Enlightenment, to some extent ancients) then it follows that Kierkegaard is ultimately a fideist. If you do not think that there is a “neutral position,” then the fideist label doesn't hold much water anyways, and you're probably concerned with other issues.
Regardless of where we come down on the neutral position (I fall in the latter and I suspect you and most readers do as well), the common reading that you point out is just far too simplistic. For starters, it should go without saying that the ethical holds a very high position in Kierkegaard's thought. I think one of the major points in Fear and Trembling is that the knight of faith has to be the knight of infinite resignation first – and he can only be the knight of infinite resignation if he is in the ethical stage. The knight of faith doesn't simply reject the ethical for the religious, either.
It's way more complicated than that. At the risk of being a jackass and writing people off, my suspicion is simply that most who put forward this “common reading” have never engaged Kierkegaard in any serious way. Maybe that's not the case, but I've never encountered someone who presents this misreading of Kierkegaard who offers up anything beyond a propositional account of why Kierkegaard is a fideist. I never see explanations of the stages – which are way too foundational to ignore or gloss over, and I would also wager that most of them have not read Stages on Life's Way or even Either/Or or the Postscript.
With that said, in the little bit I've been exposed to, I'm a little wary of the so-called postmodern reading of Kierkegaard. On one hand I appreciate the creative misreadings, but on the other I think these readings get some things wrong that are due to a context we can't force Kierkegaard into. With that said, I'm no expert and I don't want to pretend to be. I think I have a pretty good handle on the stages, and I zealously? agree with you that this common attack on Kierkegaard as some kind of irrational fideist is simplistic at best.
It's one reason why I think Fear and Trembling is just a bad place to start reading Kierkegaard. it's the most popular, probably, but there's way too much going on for someone who hasn't at least had some kind of introduction to Kierkegaard's wider thought. Maybe, maybe, if someone read a good intro book like the Gardiner one or a recent book by Michael Watts, it would be a suitable place to start. Probably the best, in my opinion, would be something like Either/Or or one of the later direct communication works. I think my first sustained reading of Kierkegaard was concentrated sections of the Postscript. It's a tough work, but it's worth it, and it's where I would start someone. If I were teaching an Intro class, I think I'd find it tough to shoehorn Kierkegaard in.
Anyways, I'm rambling now and it's way past time for bed.
Dave
31 Jul 09 at 3:02 am
Regarding choice and deontology/utilitarianism: choice plays an enormous role for Kierkegaard, as well. In terms of ethics, it's probably foundational.
Blake, I agree with you that the “common” reading of Kierkegaard gets him wrong in terms of irrational fideism. I think at root the issue is whether or not we think there is some neutral position by which to stand on. From those I've encountered and discussed Kierkegaard with, it generally seems like if you do think there is a “neutral position,” (ie Enlightenment, to some extent ancients) then it follows that Kierkegaard is ultimately a fideist. If you do not think that there is a “neutral position,” then the fideist label doesn't hold much water anyways, and you're probably concerned with other issues.
Regardless of where we come down on the neutral position (I fall in the latter and I suspect you and most readers do as well), the common reading that you point out is just far too simplistic. For starters, it should go without saying that the ethical holds a very high position in Kierkegaard's thought. I think one of the major points in Fear and Trembling is that the knight of faith has to be the knight of infinite resignation first – and he can only be the knight of infinite resignation if he is in the ethical stage. The knight of faith doesn't simply reject the ethical for the religious, either.
It's way more complicated than that. At the risk of being a jackass and writing people off, my suspicion is simply that most who put forward this “common reading” have never engaged Kierkegaard in any serious way. Maybe that's not the case, but I've never encountered someone who presents this misreading of Kierkegaard who offers up anything beyond a propositional account of why Kierkegaard is a fideist. I never see explanations of the stages – which are way too foundational to ignore or gloss over, and I would also wager that most of them have not read Stages on Life's Way or even Either/Or or the Postscript.
With that said, in the little bit I've been exposed to, I'm a little wary of the so-called postmodern reading of Kierkegaard. On one hand I appreciate the creative misreadings, but on the other I think these readings get some things wrong that are due to a context we can't force Kierkegaard into. With that said, I'm no expert and I don't want to pretend to be. I think I have a pretty good handle on the stages, and I zealously? agree with you that this common attack on Kierkegaard as some kind of irrational fideist is simplistic at best.
It's one reason why I think Fear and Trembling is just a bad place to start reading Kierkegaard. it's the most popular, probably, but there's way too much going on for someone who hasn't at least had some kind of introduction to Kierkegaard's wider thought. Maybe, maybe, if someone read a good intro book like the Gardiner one or a recent book by Michael Watts, it would be a suitable place to start. Probably the best, in my opinion, would be something like Either/Or or one of the later direct communication works. I think my first sustained reading of Kierkegaard was concentrated sections of the Postscript. It's a tough work, but it's worth it, and it's where I would start someone. If I were teaching an Intro class, I think I'd find it tough to shoehorn Kierkegaard in.
Anyways, I'm rambling now and it's way past time for bed.
Dave
31 Jul 09 at 9:02 am